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In a participative budgeting setting, this paper examines the relative merits of different choices regarding to whom to 
assign budget rejection authority in a hierarchical firm. While the participative budgeting literature has traditionally 
examined dyadic firms (i.e. firms consisting of only an owner and a worker), many firms exist as taller hierarchies. 
In such firms, the question of where to locate an important budgetary control – rejection authority – in order to 
promote improved budgetary reporting becomes meaningful. It is hypothesized that delegating budget rejection 
authority to the manager leads to increased slack consumption by the agent in comparison to the situation in which 
the principal retains such authority. Research questions address whether the agents report more accurately when 
both the manager and the principal have rejection authority by comparison to the arrangement in which only one of 
these individuals hold such power. Results generally suggest that delegating rejection authority to the manager does 
not entail agency related costs.  Further, agent slack capture is least when the control is duplicated but this benefit 
comes at a substantial decrease in the amount of surplus the firm can capture. 
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I. Introduction 
 This study examines how the choice of where to locate budget rejection authority within 
a hierarchical firm impacts the reporting choices of agents in a participative budgeting setting. 
Firms spend vast amounts of time and money on the budgeting process. While participative 
budgeting provides a means for the principal to obtain the agent’s private, unobservable 
information, thereby improving future firm performance through better planning, this benefit 
comes at the cost of exposing the firm to the potential for opportunistic misreporting by the agent 
(Jensen 2003). Given these concerns regarding the value of participative budgeting, a substantial 
amount of accounting literature investigates means by which to ameliorate the downsides 
associated with its use (for a review of the literature, see Rasmuβen 2015).  
A feature common in most of the prior budgeting literature is that the firm is presumed to 
have a flat structure – i.e. it consists of a principal and one or more (peer) subordinate agents. To 
the contrary, many firms are organized as hierarchies in which there are one or more levels of 
managers who act as intermediaries between the principal and the agent(s). Prior literature 
generally suggests that firms add managerial levels when time constraints or informational 
processing burdens on the principal become too great and force delegation of some duties to 
managers (e.g. Harris and Raviv 2002, Colombo and Grilli 2013). Since the principal is typically 
thought to have an array of duties, a question that arises when examining firms with more than 
two hierarchical levels is whether the principal should delegate supervision of controls intended 
to improve budgetary reporting to subordinate actors. This question is the focus of the current 
study. 
One of the most intuitive controls to place on the participative budgeting process is 
budget rejection authority (Rankin, Schwartz, and Young 2008). While participative budgeting 
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allows the agent to be involved in the budgeting process, it is not often the case that they are 
given carte blanche to set their own budget with no oversight from their superior. The rejection 
authority implemented in Rankin et al (2008) reflects this fact. One of the general results from 
that study (and the extensional Douthit and Stevens 2015) is that agents claim less budgetary 
slack when principals are granted the authority to reject the agent’s budget. However, while 
rejection authority would, by necessity, be held by the principal in a flat firm, if a hierarchical 
firm wished to implement rejection authority, it faces an important choice regarding where to 
locate such authority. Specifically, it could grant rejection authority to the principal, as in a flat 
firm, or it could choose to delegate supervision of the control to a manager. Importantly, these 
are independent decisions in the sense that the decision to grant rejection authority to one party 
does not preclude granting such authority to the other party. This implies that, if rejection 
authority has been implemented in a hierarchical firm, there are three possible cases. The 
principal, alone, could retain the ability to reject the budget, this power could be delegated to the 
manager alone, or both the principal and the manager could be granted rejection authority. The 
last case is particularly important because it represents a situation in which a control has 
effectively been duplicated, which has no analog in a flat firm.  
Assuming that there are benefits to each of the choices above, the question then turns to 
the relative benefits of each arrangement. In the absence of rejection authority, traditional agency 
theory treats the presence of additional hierarchical levels as irrelevant to the decision of any of 
the economic actors. Since preferences in such analyses are assumed to be solely for pecuniary 
payoffs, the prediction is that the agent consumes the entirety of the available slack. As a result, 
regardless of the vertical arrangement of the firm, the amount transferred to the residual claimant 
(and to any other intermediate actors) is the same – zero. However, when rejection authority has 
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been granted, the agent must take into account the fact that their budget can potentially be 
rejected, and traditional agency theory predicts that slack capture is reduced as a result. This 
should be the case regardless of where rejection authority exists within the firm.  
When comparing the situations in which only one superior actor (i.e. the manager or the 
principal) has rejection authority, I turn to traditional agency theory. The game theoretical 
solution to the situation in which only the principal has rejection authority is that the agent 
allocates more of the surplus to the manager (than when only the manager has rejection 
authority) to ensure that the principal does not reject the budget. I therefore hypothesize that the 
slack capture of agents will be greater when only the manager has budget rejection authority than 
when only the principal has such authority. 
When examining the case in which both superior actors have budget rejection authority, it 
may seem straightforward and intuitively appealing to expect that less slack would be captured 
by the agent than in circumstances in which only one superior actor holds such power. However, 
due to changes in behaviour due to restrictions on autonomy, differences in perceptions of the 
probability of budget rejection, and tradeoffs between preferences for fairness and concerns for 
strategic issues, there are reasons to suspect that the average amount of slack captured by the 
agent may increase. Due to these competing directional effects, I state two research questions to 
examine how agent slack capture differs between the situation in which both the manager and 
principal hold rejection authority and each of the two situations in which only one of these 
individuals has rejection authority. 
To test the hypothesis and explore the research questions, I conducted a 2x2 experiment 
in which manager rejection authority and principal rejection authority are each manipulated at 
two levels (absent/present). Participants take the role of either agent, manager, or principal in a 
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hypothetical three-tier hierarchical firm and interact over twelve periods to perform a budgeting 
task based on the instruments used in Evans, Hannan, Krishnan and Moser (2001) and Rankin et 
al (2008).1 I find that, consistent with prior literature (e.g. Forsythe et al 1994, Rankin et al 2008, 
Douthit and Stevens 2015), granting rejection authority to some superior actor in the firm’s 
hierarchy (i.e. the manager and/or principal) leads to less slack capture on the part of the agent. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, results suggest that there is no significant difference in slack capture 
by the agent when only the manager has rejection authority compared to when only the principal 
has rejection authority. Analysis of the research questions suggests that slack capture is 
decreased by giving both the manager and the principal rejection authority by comparison to 
giving only the principal such authority but that this comes at the cost of the firm foregoing a 
substantial amount of their potential surplus due to budget rejections.2 Additional analyses 
provide insight into the fact that the information asymmetry present in the setting causes superior 
actors (the manager and principal) to struggle with identifying the exact characteristics of the 
reports they receive, sometimes leading to what appear to be strictly irrational choices.  
 This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. From an academic 
perspective, this paper explores theory that suggests that implementation of budgetary rejection 
authority at the manager level entails an agency cost stemming from increased misreporting at 
the agent level. From a practitioner’s standpoint, this paper provides empirical evidence to guide 
management accountants as they make choices with regards to which control tasks should be 
delegated to which members of the firm. Specifically, the agency costs outlined above are not 
                                                          
1 This study takes the three-tier hierarchical structure of the firm as given. Section two briefly discusses why 
managers may exist, thereby leading to a three-tier (or taller) structure. 
2 This result is similar in spirit to the results described in Baiman et al (2007) in which the authors demonstrate 
analytically that an internal auction mechanism can allocate firm resources in a first-best, socially efficient manner, 
but only at a cost to the principal of paying out costly incentives to the manager.  
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observed which suggests that firms can delegate rejection authority to managers without fear of 
inducing poorer agent reporting. Further, this study presents, to the best of my knowledge, the 
first evidence of the effects of implementation of redundant controls; when both the manager and 
the principal have rejection authority, the same control (i.e. budget rejection) has been 
implemented at different levels in the firm. Results indicate that implementing rejection authority 
at both the manager and principal levels results in the lowest amount of agent misreporting, 
implying that firms may profitably employ multiple levels of budgetary review.  
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides background and develops the 
hypothesis and research questions. Section three explains the experiment used to test the 
predictions, which is followed by a discussion of the analyses. Section five concludes. 
 
II. BACKGROUND and DEVELOPMENT of HYPOTHESES 
Background 
Participative budgeting has been explored for at least six decades. The earliest study, 
Argyris (1952), recommended that participative budgeting be implemented in firms to alleviate 
dysfunctional behaviours resulting from the pressure to achieve mandated budget targets. From 
an efficiency standpoint, participative budgeting allows the firm to integrate useful information 
held only by those individuals who perform the firm’s day-to-day operations which can lead to 
improved decision-making (Horngren et al 2018). In contrast to both the notional benefits of this 
budgeting method and the fact that it is frequently observed in practice (Shields and Shields 
1998), the traditional agency theory analysis of the participative budgeting arrangement suggests 
that it should have little value (Jensen 2003). Agents are predicted to misreport their private 
information to the full extent possible due to a misalignment of the incentives between the agent 
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and principal stemming from a formulation of the utility function as only admitting arguments 
for wealth and leisure (Ross 1973, Jensen and Meckling 1976). In an attempt to reconcile these 
contradictory observations, several accounting studies have noted that agents have preferences 
for non-pecuniary sources of utility. Such preferences tend to ease the misalignment of 
incentives between the principal and agent, implying that the participative budgeting 
arrangement does provide value, even from a theoretical standpoint. Examples of such non-
pecuniary factors are the preference for honesty (Evans et al 2001), the desire to appear honest 
in the face of an information system (Hannan et al 2006, Abdel-Rahim and Stevens 2018), 
concerns for reputation formation (Stevens 2002), non-binding communication (Rankin et al 
2003), and agents’ perceptions of the principal’s fairness (Zhang 2008). 
As an alternative to any of the control mechanisms described above, the firm could 
attempt to encourage better reporting behaviour by implementing budget rejection authority – i.e. 
the principal is granted the right to reject the agent’s budget proposal. Should the budget be 
rejected, the firm’s surplus is lost (see Rankin et al 2008, Hannan et al 2010, and Douthit and 
Stevens 2015). Studies generally find that agents misreport less when faced with the possibility 
that their budget may be rejected.  
 As noted above, however, the bulk of accounting studies in this area portray the firm as 
having only two levels (i.e. one level inhabited by the principal and a subordinate level populated 
by all the, possibly numerous, agents). It is certainly the case that some firms are structured in 
this fashion, but a great many firms exist as taller hierarchies. Literature in economics explores 
the question of why firms with more than one agent adopt any particular vertical structure and 
what the optimal hierarchical structure should be (see e.g. Calvo and Wellisz 1978, Keren and 
Levhari 1979, Qian 1994). Regardless of the firm’s exact hierarchical structure, a point that is 
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made repeatedly in this stream of literature is that humans are boundedly rational – i.e. they do 
not possess the ability to instantly process an infinite amount of information (Simon 1957, 
Williamson 1967, van Zandt 1996). This means that as the firm expands (and there are strong 
incentives to do so – namely monopoly power; Knight 2009) there inevitably comes a point at 
which the principal can no longer process all the information generated by the firm and no longer 
has sufficient time to monitor all the agents. As a consequence, the principal must delegate some 
of their responsibility to one of the agents. Presuming that the delegated tasks are supervisory in 
nature, such as budgetary review, it must be the case that a managerial layer of the firm results.3 
Additionally, while there is some evidence that firms may be decreasing their height by 
eliminating some hierarchical levels (Rajan and Wulf 2006), there is also empirical evidence that 
firms grow taller, particularly as they “grow up” from their initial owner-operated structure to 
one that includes middle management (Colombo and Delmastro 1999, Colombo and Grilli 2013).  
The preceding discussion leads to two, first-principles questions with regards to rejection 
authority in hierarchical firms (Young 2010). First, because the surplus available from the 
agent’s improved reporting may be consumed by an intermediate actor (i.e. the manager) before 
it reaches the principal, is rejection authority still useful in hierarchical firms? Second, if 
rejection authority is implemented, where within the firm’s hierarchy should it be implemented? 
While there have been a handful of studies in the accounting literature that examine firms that 
are taller than a dyad, these either investigate topics other than participative budgeting (e.g. 
Hales and Williamson 2010, Arshad et al 2018, Kuang and Yang 2017), or deviate from the 
                                                          
3 As long as the marginal product of each of the responsibilities that the principal retains exceed their marginal 
product of budgetary review, it is sensible to grant budgetary control (e.g. budget rejection authority) to the 
manager. This is the case even if the information asymmetry between the manager and the agent is identical to the 
information asymmetry between the principal and the agent.  
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stylized conception of how information flows within hierarchical firms (Cardinaels et al 2014; 
for discussion of information flows see Shun and Yun 2017).  
 
Development of Hypotheses 
This study uses a design adapted from the standard budgeting setting found in Evans et al 
(2001) and Rankin et al (2008) to examine participative budgeting in a firm with three 
hierarchical levels. At the top of the firm exists the principal who acts as residual claimant. At 
the next lower level is a manager whose duty is to aggregate and pass on budgetary requests 
from the agent who resides at the lowest level of the firm. This setup is consistent with many 
studies in the economics literature on optimum firm height (e.g. Keren and Levhari 1979, 
Marschak and Reichelstein 1998, Jun and Kim 2010). In this basic setting, the agent possesses 
private and unverifiable information about the firm’s production cost. They then make a cost 
report to the manager. If the agent misrepresents their cost by stating a cost higher than the one 
they observe, they consume the difference between their report and their actual information as 
budgetary slack. The manager receives the agent’s cost report as their own private information 
and then allocates the resulting profit between themselves and the principal. Two manipulations 
introduce the ability for one or more of the superior actors to reject the budget. Specifically, 
manager rejection authority is manipulated as either present or absent and principal rejection 
authority is manipulated as either present or absent. If the budget is rejected (in conditions in 
which budget rejection authority exists), production is suspended, and no member of the firm 
claims any of the available surplus (defined as the firm’s revenue less the agent’s private cost 
information).  
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The basic setting (i.e. that does not incorporate budget rejection authority) is a natural 
extension of Evans et al (2001) with an additional hierarchical level. Further, one of the 
important commentaries in Rankin et al (2008) is that the participative budgeting setting is 
structurally similar to either a dictator game (absent rejection authority) or an ultimatum game 
(with rejection authority).4,5 Consequently, the participative budgeting setting in which no 
rejection authority has been implemented can be compared to two, back-to-back (or sequential) 
dictator games. The agent acts as the first dictator who makes an allocation between themselves 
and the manager by reporting their privately observed production cost. The manager then uses 
the information sent to them by the agent to make a dictator allocation between themselves and 
the principal. As noted in the previous section, while the traditional agency theory prediction is 
that the agent will consume the entirety of the available surplus by reporting the maximum 
possible cost, there is overwhelming evidence that this prediction is not empirically descriptive. 
Dictators don’t always take their entire endowment in dyadic relationships (see Camerer 2003 
for an extensive review) and in sequential dictator games, the first mover has been shown to send 
somewhat less than 30% of their initial endowment, on average (Bonein and Serra 2008 and 
Bahr and Requate 2014). However, these studies also show that while the prediction of 
completely self-interested behaviour is not, on average, observed empirically, there are frequent 
instances in which the entire pie is consumed by the dictator. For example, in Forsythe et al 
(1994), between 21% and 36% of dictators sent nothing, depending on the size of the stakes; 
                                                          
4 In a dictator game, a dictator is given an endowment (often $10) and asked to split it with a receiver (Kahneman et 
al 1986). The players each receive the allocated amounts. An ultimatum game is very similar in that a proposer is 
given an endowment and asked to split the amount with a receiver. The difference is that the receiver can either 
accept or reject the proposed allocation. If they accept, both players receive the allocated amounts; if they reject both 
players receive nothing (Güth et al 1982). 
5 The participative budgeting setting deviates from the traditional dictator setting in that the dictator's (agent's) 
endowment is hidden and stochastic. Further, preferences for honesty are a potential element in the participative 
budgeting setting as the dictator must make a factual assertion, which is not a component of the traditional dictator 
setting. 
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similarly, Evans et al (2001) find that between 27% and 29% of agents (which is the functional 
equivalent of the dictator role in their study) send nothing. It is important to note that in 
participative budgeting setting, situations in which the agent consumes the entire pie imply that 
the firm earns no profit, even though profitable production can usually occur.  
As discussed above, a means to reduce not only the average slack capture by the agent 
but also the incidence of complete slack capture, would be to incorporate rejection authority. 
Presumably, this control should be effective regardless of where it is situated within the 
hierarchy. However, unless this result is empirically confirmed, interpretation of the remainder 
of the study would be challenging. Consequently, I state the following proposition: 
 
Proposition: Regardless of where it is located within the firm’s hierarchy, rejection authority 
leads to less average slack capture by agents compared to the condition in which no rejection 
authority is granted. 
 
Presuming that granting rejection authority somewhere within the hierarchy serves to 
improve reporting from the agent, the interesting question then becomes exactly where to locate 
such authority. The most conservative choice, in terms of cost and ease of implementation, 
would be to grant rejection authority to a single individual - either the manager only or the 
principal only. Extending the discussion comparing participative budgeting to dictator and 
ultimatum games suggests that when only the manager has rejection authority, participative 
budgeting in a three-tier hierarchy is comparable to a sequential ultimatum-dictator game. 
Similarly, the situation in which only the principal has rejection authority can be compared to a 
sequential dictator-ultimatum game. Under standard agency theory assumptions, the agent is 
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predicted to capture less slack in the latter case (i.e. principal only rejection authority) than in the 
former case. An example is illustrative. 
Assume that the agent has $10 to allocate and the smallest indivisible unit is $1. In an 
ultimatum-dictator arrangement (i.e. rejection authority granted to only the manager), the 
traditional agency theory prediction is that the agent keeps $9 and sends $1 to the manager. This 
is because the agent needs to send them only the smallest amount to ensure that the manager 
accepts the proposal – the principal is not a concern.6 The manager accepts, keeps the $1, and 
sends nothing to the owner. 
When only the principal has rejection authority, and under the same endowment 
assumptions as the previous paragraph, the agent is predicted to keep $8 and send $2 to the 
manager (Güth et al 1996). To see why this is, consider the usual prediction for a dyadic 
ultimatum game. If the agent keeps $9 and sends the manager $1, the manager has two choices. 
On one hand, they can keep the $1 and send $0 to the principal, who is likely to reject the 
proposal. On the other hand, they can keep $0 and send $1 to the principal who will accept the 
proposal. In either event, the manager’s payoff is $0, and they are therefore indifferent between 
the two choices. Note that the agent would prefer that the manager send the $1 to the principal 
(because the agent gets to keep what they allocated to themselves if the principal accepts), but 
due to the manager’s indifference, there is no guarantee of this happening. To solve this issue, 
the agent must send $2 to the manager, who then keeps $1 and sends $1 to the principal thereby 
assuring the latter’s acceptance. Using the underlying economic games to draw conclusions 
                                                          
6 Technically speaking, there are two subgame perfect equilibria in the basic ultimatum game (Forsythe et al 1994). 
In one, the proposer sends nothing and the responder, gaining no utility from rejecting such a proposal, accepts 
(Güth et al 1982). However, since the responder is indifferent between rejecting and accepting, they could equally 
choose to reject which implies that the proposer does better, in expectation, by sending the minimum possible 
amount which they know the receiver will not reject (Abbink et al 1999). This is the second SPE. 
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about the budgeting setting, one can see that the prediction is that the agent captures less slack 
when only the principal holds rejection authority than when only the manager holds rejection 
authority, as hypothesized below: 
 
H1: Average slack capture by agents will be greater when only the manager has budget rejection 
authority than when only the principal has budget rejection authority. 
 
Rather than granting budget rejection authority at a single level in the hierarchy, the firm 
could choose to give both the manager and the principal this authority. When both superior 
actors (i.e. the manager and the principal) have budget rejection authority, the setting resembles a 
sequential ultimatum game – the agent and the manager are both proposers whose recipients can 
potentially reject their proposals (Güth et al 1996). The game theoretic solution in this case is 
identical to the situation in which only the principal has rejection authority: the agent sends twice 
the minimum amount to the manager who keeps half, sending the minimum amount to the 
principal (using the example from above, the payoffs would be $8/$1/$1 to the 
agent/manager/principal). Thus, traditional agency theory predicts that there is no value to 
granting rejection authority to the manager when the principal also possesses this authority.  
Moving away from the traditional agency theory predictions, this setting is essentially a 
combination of the settings in which the individual superior actors have rejection authority and it 
is intuitively appealing to posit that slack capture should be less when both superior actors can 
reject the budget. While there is literature that examines the interplay of the various components 
of management control systems (e.g. Kennedy and Widener 2008), there appears to be a dearth 
of studies that examine the effects of multiple, duplicated, controls. Despite this, conditional on 
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the effects of granting rejection authority being additive and linear, agents should claim less 
slack than in either of the instances in which only one of the superior actors have rejection 
authority.  
There are, however, several reasons to suspect that the effect of duplicated rejection 
authority may not be linear or additive. First, it important to recognize that while rejection 
authority has been duplicated, it has been duplicated at adjacent hierarchical levels, not within 
the same level. In other words, it is not the case that the agent makes an allocation between 
themselves and the principal which is first reviewed by the manager and then subsequently 
reviewed by the principal. Instead, the manager reviews the agent’s choice and then incorporates 
a choice of their own before the principal has an opportunity to make their approve or reject 
decision. This implies a substantially more complex strategic environment than in the dyadic 
relationship, one in which linear and additive effects of incorporating budget rejection may not 
be observed. 
Second, the motivation crowding literature often explains the counter-intuitive result that 
the imposition of a control decreases the desired behaviour relative to a situation in which the 
control is absent by appealing to the notion that individuals have a dispreference for restricted 
autonomy (Frey and Jegen 2001, Falk and Kosfeld 2006). Since there are two individuals who 
can potentially reject the budget, the agent may perceive that the choice set that leads to budget 
acceptance has been substantially restricted. and, as a result, that their autonomy has been 
reduced. This suggests that the motivation crowding effects observed elsewhere in the literature 
may lead to increased slack capture when both superior agents have budget rejection authority. 
Third, and related to the prior argument, multiple “rejection nodes” (i.e. places in the 
hierarchy at which the budget can be rejected) likely influence the agent’s perception of the 
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chance that the budget will be rejected. Specifically, if both the manager and principal can reject 
the budget, there is a (weakly) greater chance that the budget will be rejected than when only one 
of those two individuals possess rejection authority. Further, to the extent that agents, 
irrespective of the condition, have a desired expected payoff in mind when they make a report, 
this increased probability of rejection should influence their reporting. Expected value has two 
parts – a probability and a payoff magnitude. Since the probability of rejection increases due to 
the addition of another rejection node, the only way the agent can maintain their desired expected 
payoff is to increase the magnitude of the payoff. This would be accomplished by building in 
additional slack, implying that greater slack is captured by agents when both the principal and 
the agent have rejection authority than when one or the other alone has such authority. 
Finally, Knez and Camerer (1995) and Camerer (2003) make the point that a fundamental 
difference between dictator and ultimatum games is the presence of a strategic component to 
ultimatum games. Specifically, proposers in ultimatum games must respect the fact that the 
responder can reject their proposal. This leads the average proposer to offer a larger share to the 
receiver. However, the fact that dictators send anything to receivers in dictator games suggests 
that preferences for fairness (or altruism) do exist. It is difficult to disentangle these two 
motivations (strategic concerns and preferences for fairness) in an ultimatum game because they 
look identical from a behavioural standpoint – i.e. the proposer sends more money. The 
aforementioned papers point out that it may be the case that fairness motivations drive behaviour 
less in ultimatum games than in dictator games because the responder in an ultimatum game can 
“stick up for themselves.” Moving back to the current study, in both conditions in which only 
one superior actor has rejection authority, one of them is subject to receiving an allocation from a 
dictator. However, when both superior actors have rejection authority, this is no longer the case 
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and may suggest that the agent claims more slack because both the manager and the principal are 
able to impact their own payoffs.7 This argument is consistent with Rankin et al (2008) who 
posit that the strategic component introduced by granting budget rejection authority serves to 
reduce the perception of budgeting as an ethical dilemma.  
Given the competing effects described in the preceding discussion, I pose the following 
two research questions:  
 
RQ1: Do agents capture more slack on average when both the manager and the principal have 
rejection authority by comparison to the setting in which only the manager has rejection 
authority? 
RQ2: Do agents capture more slack on average when both the manager and the principal have 
rejection authority by comparison to the setting in which only the principal has rejection 
authority? 
 
III. Method 
Experimental Design and Procedures 
To examine the posed questions, I conducted a 2x2 full-factorial experiment in which the 
presence of managerial authority to reject the budget and the presence of principal authority to 
reject the budget are each manipulated at two levels (absent/present) between-subjects. This 
leads to four conditions: None (i.e. no rejection authority), Manager (only the manager has 
                                                          
7 Note that this argument does not suggest that lowest average slack capture should be observed in the condition in 
which no rejection authority exists. The argument is that concerns for fairness exist both when rejection authority is 
present and when it is not, but that these concerns are replaced, to some degree, by strategic concerns when rejection 
authority is present. The argument made in the text is that fairness concerns are suppressed when there is no dictator 
allocation in the hierarchy – i.e. when both superior agents have rejection authority.  
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rejection authority), Principal (only the principal has rejection authority), and Both (the manager 
and the principal have rejection authority).  
 Upon entering the laboratory, participants were seated at computer terminals separated by 
privacy partitions. After a brief introduction by an experimental facilitator, computerized 
instructions were provided, followed by a computerized quiz. In the event that a participant 
answered a question incorrectly, they were given reminder information about the relevant portion 
of the instructions and required to answer the question correctly before proceeding. 
Participants are assigned a role – either agent, manager, or principal - at random and 
maintain their roles for the duration of the experimental session.8 Participants are informed that 
they will be grouped into firms consisting of one of each of the three roles and that these firms 
will be maintained throughout the session. The participants interact for twelve periods by 
completing a task adapted from Evans et al (2001). The task of each firm is to prepare a 
production budget for each period and each member of the firm receives a salary to compensate 
them for their budgeting efforts. The salaries of the participants in other roles are kept hidden 
(e.g. the manager is unaware of the magnitude of the salary provided to either the principal or the 
agent and vice versa). Agents receive $5.00, managers receive $7.50, and principals receive 
$10.00 at the beginning of each period. These values were selected in order to approximately 
equalize average payoffs across the roles.  
In the None condition, the budgeting process starts with the agent being provided private 
information regarding the production cost for the period. Costs are drawn from a uniform 
distribution with support of [$13.00, $27.00].9 Twelve costs were randomly generated prior to 
                                                          
8 During the experiment, these roles were referred to as Worker, Manager, and Owner, respectively. For expositional 
clarity, I will continue to use the terms agent, manager, and principal throughout the manuscript. 
9 As indicated in the text, all costs are presented to the participants in dollars, rather than experimental currency units 
(ECUs). There is a substantial literature in economics regarding money illusion, which describes differences in 
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the experimental sessions and presented in a random order to each agent. After observing the 
production cost for the period, the agent then reports a cost to the manager. The agent consumes 
any difference between their report and the actual cost as budgetary slack. The manager then 
sends a report to the principal regarding the amount of profit that the principal will receive. In 
each period, the firm receives $27.00 of revenue from sales of the product they produce. The 
profit available for the manager to send to the principal is the difference between the firm’s 
revenue and the agent’s reported cost. Any profits that are not sent to the principal are retained 
by the manager. At the end of each round, participants receive only reminder information about 
the decision(s) they made during the round that has just been completed before moving on to the 
subsequent period (this design choice is discussed in greater detail below). In each round, each 
role has additional questions to answer immediately following the decisions detailed above. The 
manager is asked to give an estimate of the actual production cost and the owner is asked to give 
an estimate of the available amount of profit. After round twelve, process measures are collected. 
Following the post-experiment questionnaire, one period was selected at random for 
payment and the results of the decisions from that period were shown to the participants. Once 
this information was digested, the participants were paid in private for the selected period. With 
the exception of the private production cost provided to the agent and the salaries of the 
respective members of the firm, the experimental process and parameters were common 
knowledge among all participants. 
In the conditions in which one or more of the participants have rejection authority, the 
individual with such authority is asked to either approve or reject the budget before they make 
                                                          
behaviour stemming from maximization of nominal currency rather than real currency. Prior experimental studies 
provide some indication that denominating payoffs in ECUs can lead to important differences in the choices of 
participants (see, e.g. Mazar et al 2008) which is why all payoffs are denominated in dollars in this study, which is 
also consistent with the design choice made in Evans et al (2001). 
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their decision (if any). For example, in the Both condition, the manager receives the production 
cost report from the agent after which they are asked to either approve or reject the budget. 
Conditional on the manager approving the budget, they then divide the available profit between 
themselves and the principal. The principal then decides to either approve or reject the allocation. 
If any of the individuals with rejection authority choose to reject the budget, production does not 
occur for that period and each member of the firm receives only their salary. If all the individuals 
with rejection authority approve the budget, production occurs as budgeted. In these conditions, 
the worker is asked, immediately following their production cost report, to estimate the 
probability that the budget will be approved by the individual (or individuals) with rejection 
authority. Figure 1 provides a decision tree for the three roles and the range of values that their 
choices could take.  
 
FIGURE 1
Experiment Decision Tree for Each Condition
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Design Choices 
Two specific design choices warrant additional discussion. The first is the decision to 
provide only reminder information at the end of each period. This choice was made to address 
concerns regarding the ability to compare the None condition to the conditions in which one or 
more actors have the ability to reject the budget. As noted in the previous section, the None 
condition is the functional equivalent of a sequential dictator game. As such, no learning 
regarding what acceptable behaviour entails can occur since the agent and the manager make 
dictator allocations which cannot be rejected. By comparison, in the other three conditions, the 
provision of even own-payoff information at the end of the period implies a degree of learning 
regarding the acceptable amount of surplus to retain. For example, if the agent reports a 
particular cost and the budget is rejected (regardless of who, specifically, has rejection authority), 
they can infer that the production cost they reported was too high. To the extent that this 
feedback provides cues regarding acceptable behaviour, this suggests that it would be technically 
inappropriate to compare the None condition to any of the other conditions because of a perfect 
confound between the manipulated variables and the opportunity to learn about cues to 
acceptable behaviour. Such cues have repeatedly been shown to influence choices (e.g. Bicchieri 
2006). As a result, while it is uncommon not to provide information on at least own-payoffs at 
the end of each period, the instrument described above withholds this information until the end 
of the experiment (for examples of such a design choice, however, see Abbink et al 1999).  
In addition to the above discussion, keeping information restricted is attractive for two 
other reasons. First, because no information regarding the actions of the other actors in the firm 
is provided, there is no reason to re-pair participants. This enables me to provide each member of 
the firm with each of the twelve costs. If own-payoff information were provided, this would 
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necessitate re-pairing each round to avoid reputation formation and it would be exceedingly 
difficult, if not impossible, to prevent the manager and principal from being grouped multiple 
times with an agent facing a particular cost. For example, a manager could, in theory, end up 
being paired with an agent that faced the highest production cost in all twelve rounds. This 
substantially curtails opportunities for analysis of the behaviour of the managers and principals. 
Relatedly, providing no payoff feedback after each round enables me to analyze an individual 
agent’s set of choices over the full set of costs, free from any influence regarding whether their 
budget proposal had been rejected in the prior period. The influence of changing costs is often 
expected to have an impact in participative budgeting studies, but the analysis of this effect is 
often contaminated by the impact of decisions made in previous rounds (e.g. a budget proposal 
being rejected). 
Second, the goal of this study is to examine budgeting in a single-period setting. While 
dynamic budgeting settings present interesting opportunities for research, they are outside the 
scope of the current study. As this is the case, withholding feedback until the end of the 
experiment better preserves the independence of observations in each round which is more in 
line with the single-period setting that is of primary interest. 
The second design choice that requires additional explication is the structure of the salary 
information provision. Keeping the salary of the superior actors hidden is consistent with prior 
literature that attempts to control for the distributive preferences of agents (Douthit and Stevens 
2015). While this is not the focus of the current study, it does provide control for distributive 
fairness preferences that exist orthogonal to the decision by an agent to report a specific cost. 
However, this study also keeps hidden the salary of the subordinate members of the firm (e.g. 
the principal does not know the salary of the manager or agent). While it is appealing to endow 
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the principal with a salary from which the salaries of the manager and agent are taken, the 
concern described above regarding learning makes this choice problematic. Specifically, when, 
for example, the principal has rejection authority, if they were aware of the salary of the 
manager, they would have more complete payoff information regarding the relative payoffs to 
themselves and the manager than the manager would have when they made their profit report. 
The same dynamic exists between the manager and agent when the manager has rejection 
authority. While the agent’s behaviour is the focus of this study, the choice was made to maintain 
bilateral information asymmetry regarding the salaries of each individual to facilitate 
supplemental analyses regarding the behaviour of the managers and principals.  
 
Participants 
 Participants were 231 undergraduate students at a public university in the United States 
who were recruited from a participant database. Average compensation (which included a $5 
show-up payment) was $13.68 for agents, $14.17 for managers, and $15.88 for principals and 
63% of participants were female. The experiment was administered using the zTree software 
(Fischbacher 2007) and IRB approval was obtained prior to administering the experiment. A 
requirement for using the laboratory in which this study was conducted is that no deception is 
employed. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
This section begins with a discussion of the descriptive statistics and is followed by tests 
of the predictions. The section concludes with a series of supplemental analyses. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 Average slack capture by the agent across the four conditions is presented in Table 1 and 
box plots provide a visual summary of the data in Figure 2. Slack capture is measured in a 
manner consistent with prior literature as [Reported Cost – Actual Cost]/[$27 – Actual Cost]. 
Recall that $27 is the maximum cost that can be reported. Note that this measure is unaffected by 
whether the budget was rejected or not; it is, in essence, the attempted slack capture by the agent. 
As can be seen in the table, the most slack was captured, on average, in the None condition and 
the least amount of slack was captured in the Both condition. Additional descriptive information 
is provided in Figure 3, which shows the average amount of slack capture by agents across the 
various actual costs. Recall from the experimental design that each agent saw all twelve pre-
drawn costs in a random order. One of the surprising results from this figure is that the percent of 
slack captured seems largely invariant to the cost. This runs contrary to intuition that suggests 
that, when there is more room to share surplus (i.e. when the actual cost is lower), agents tend to 
capture less slack.  
 
Tests of Predictions 
Table 2 presents t-test comparisons of the average amount of slack captured in the 
various conditions. The proposition states that slack capture will be greatest in the None 
condition (i.e. where no rejection authority has been granted). Not surprisingly, strong support 
provided for the proposition. Table 2, Panel A shows that comparisons of average slack between 
the None condition and the other three conditions all indicate that the average slack capture in the 
None condition is statistically greater. As speculated in the development of the proposition, the 
number of reports of the maximum possible cost (i.e. $27) are substantially higher in the None 
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condition (130 reports) than in the Manager, Principal, or Both conditions (34, 26, and 13 
reports, respectively). The results of the t-tests are also supported in untabulated regression 
analysis in which slack capture is regressed on the conditions. A note about the regression 
analyses conducted in this paper is in order. As the dependent variable, slack capture, is a 
percentage bounded by zero and one, standard OLS regressions are inappropriate. Further, logit, 
probit and tobit regressions are not appropriate because, in the case of logit and probit, values of 
zero or one are undefined and, in the case of tobit, the data has not been censored. Consequently, 
I follow the recommendation of Baum (2008) and use a generalized linear model with a logit link 
Mean % Slack
(Std. Dev)
None 0.7756
n = 240 (0.3345)
Manager 0.5632
n = 240 (.3145)
Principal 0.5933
n = 240 (.2636)
Both 0.4992
n = 204 (.2668)
a Slack capture is measured as (Reported Cost - Actual Cost)/($27 - Actual Cost). This measure is 
unaffected by a budget rejection; in essence it is the amount of attempted slack capture.
Condition
TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics
Percent Slack Capture a  by Condition
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function and the binomial family clustering standard errors at the individual level. All referenced 
regressions use this method unless otherwise noted.  
 
 
  
Box Plots: Slack Capture by Condition
FIGURE 2
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% Slack Capture by Actual Cost
FIGURE 3
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Recall that H1 predicts that, when only the manager is granted budget rejection authority, 
slack capture by agents is greater than when only the principal has budget rejection authority. As 
show in Table 2, Panel B, no support is found for the prediction that agents misreport more in the 
t-statistic p-valuea
7.17 <0.01
6.63 <0.01
9.51 <0.01
t-statistic p-valuea
1.14 0.87
t-statistic p-valueb
2.27 0.02
3.73 <0.01
TABLE 2: Tests of Predictions
Panel A: Tests of Proposition
b: All t-tests two-tailed
RQ2: Slack(Both ) < Slack(Principal)
Panel C: Tests of Research Questions
RQ1: Slack(Both ) < Slack(Manager)
Slack (None ) > Slack(Principal )
Slack (None ) > Slack(Manager )
Slack (None ) > Slack(Both )
Panel B: Tests of Hypothesis
Slack (Manager ) > Slack(Principal )
a: All t-tests one-tailed
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Manager condition than in the Principal condition (p-value 0.87, one-tailed). This conclusion is 
supported in a regression framework as well. This suggests that, contrary to the agency theory 
prediction, delegating budget rejection authority entails no cost in terms of increased 
misreporting from the agent. The actual cost does not load if it is included in the regression 
specification, in line with the above commentary regarding the constancy of slack capture over 
differing actual costs.   
Turning to the research questions, cell mean comparisons show that slack capture is less 
when both the principal and the manager have rejection authority (49.92% slack claimed) by 
comparison to when either the manager only (56.32% slack claimed) or the principal only 
(59.33% slack claimed) possess such authority. Table 2, Panel C shows that these differences are 
significant at conventional levels (Manager vs. Both p-value 0.02; Principal vs. Both p-value 
<0.01, both two-tailed). However, neither of these conclusions are supported in a regression 
framework. Untabulated regression analysis suggests that granting budget rejection authority to 
both the manager and principal reduces slack capture by a marginally statistically significant (p-
value 0.11) compared to granting only the principal rejection authority, but that there is no 
benefit over granting only the manager such authority (p-value 0.37). The choice to cluster 
standard errors at the individual level in the regression framework described above is a 
conservative choice. A regression in which the standard errors are not clustered (but robust 
standard errors are still used) shows that slack capture in the Both condition is significantly less 
than in either the Principal (p<0.01) or the Manager conditions (p=0.02). Furthermore, a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distributions supports this result by indicating that the 
values in the Both condition are smaller than in the Principal condition (p<0.01) and the 
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Manager condition (p<0.01). Overall, the results indicate that granting both parties rejection 
authority provides significant benefits in terms of curbing misreporting by the agent.  
 
Supplemental Analyses 
Analyses Related to the Research Questions 
 The theory section suggests three reasons why slack capture in the Both condition might 
be greater than when only one actor possesses rejection authority. First, motivation crowding due 
to additional control implementation was conjectured to lead to greater slack capture in the Both 
condition. Second, since the likelihood that the budget is accepted is lower in the Both condition, 
it was theorized that participants may capture more slack to maintain a constant expected value. 
Finally, a speculation was made that strategic elements inherent to the sequential ultimatum 
setting may displace some concerns for fairness thereby leading to greater slack capture in the 
Both condition. While the results presented above relative to the research questions indicate that 
slack capture is less when both superior actors have rejection authority, it is worthwhile to 
provide evidence that the putative causal mechanisms were not in operation.  
Prior literature suggests that motivation crowding is caused by individuals exhibiting a 
dispreference for restrictions on their autonomy (Frey and Jegen 2001, Falk and Kosfeld 2006). 
In the post-experiment questionnaire (PEQ), each agent was asked two questions intended to 
gain insight into their perception of autonomy. Specifically, agent participants were asked, “How 
much control do you feel you had over your budget report?” and, “How restricted did you feel 
your choices were when reporting your production cost?”10 The responses to these questions are 
significantly correlated (pairwise correlation 0.41, p-value<0.01) so they are (additively) 
                                                          
10 Responses were on an 11-point Likert scale in which one was no control/very restricted and eleven was complete 
control/not at all restricted. 
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combined into one measure. Comparisons across conditions indicate that agents in the None 
condition felt that they had significantly more autonomy than in the any of the conditions 
incorporating rejection authority (all p-values<0.05). However, compared to the Both condition, 
there is no significant difference in perceived autonomy in the Manager condition (11.94 vs. 
13.95, p=0.26) and only a marginally significant higher degree of autonomy in the Principal 
condition (11.94 vs. 14.75, p=0.08).11 Note that while there is some indication that autonomy 
restriction exists, there appears to be no evidence of motivation crowding as slack capture is less 
in the conditions in which autonomy restriction is higher. 
 As discussed in the experimental design section, after their budget report was made, the 
agents were asked to estimate how likely they felt the budget was to be approved by the 
individual(s) with rejection authority.12 An examination of agents’ responses shows that agents 
did not perceive a lower probability that the budget would be approved in the Both condition 
than in either the Principal or Manager conditions (Both: 50.7%, Principal: 45.7%, Manager: 
52.9%). The general pattern that emerges from the agents’ responses is that agents indicated a 
significantly greater likelihood that the budget would be accepted when the manager had 
rejection authority than when the principal alone had such authority (Both vs. Principal p=0.04; 
Both vs. Manager p<0.01). A plausible explanation for these observations would be that the 
agent perceives a narrower social distance with the manager in the conditions in which the 
manager has rejection authority, thus leading to a higher perceived probability that the budget 
will be approved. However, an analysis of two questions intended to measure the agent’s 
perceived social distance to the manager show no significant differences between conditions (all 
                                                          
11 No significant differences are observed between the Manager and Principal conditions (13.95 vs. 14.75, p=0.57). 
12 This was asked on a Likert scale with eleven choices ranging between 0% and 100% in 10% increments.  
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p>0.10).13 Another possible reason for the deviation from the expected results of the perceived 
probability of approval is that, while the agent made their cost report and their probability 
assessment decisions sequentially, it is quite likely that these two decisions are inextricably 
linked. As a result, if the agents had been asked about the relative unconditional probability that 
cost reports are rejected in the Both condition, they may well have responded that budgets are 
less likely to be approved. However, their responses to the probability assessment were made 
conditional on their cost report which may account for the observed perceptions of budgetary 
approval likelihood.  
 Camerer (2003) discusses the idea that, because the receiver in ultimatum games can 
determine their own fate by rejecting the proposer’s offer, the proposer’s behaviour may stem 
less from concerns for fairness than from strategic concerns. Agents were asked, “How much 
effect do you feel your production cost report had on the manager (owner)?” in two questions in 
the PEQ (11-point Likert scale; 1 = “No effect at all”; 11 = “A great deal of effect”). If agents in 
fact feel that the manager and/or principal could impact their own payoff through their ability to 
reject the budget, then the answer to these PEQ questions should be significantly lower in the 
conditions in which the appropriate individual had been granted such authority. However, no 
significant differences to these questions are observed between conditions, implying that 
concerns for fairness were invariant to the manipulation of rejection authority location.  
Rejection Behaviour of Superior Actors 
In this section, I shift focus away from the agent’s reports and consider the rejection 
behaviour of managers and principals in conditions in which they were imbued with the ability to 
                                                          
13 The two questions were, “How similar to the manager do you feel you are in general?” and, “How likely is it that 
you would be friends with the manager?” Both were significantly correlated and therefore summed for the analysis 
presented in the text.  
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reject the budget. Table 3, Panel A shows the frequency of rejections made by managers and 
principals by condition; Panel B provides a more granular breakdown of the rejection behaviour 
of the two superior actors in the Both condition. Table 4, Panel A shows the average amount of 
slack accepted and rejected by managers in the Both and Manager conditions. Consistent with 
the result that slack capture is lower in the Both condition, the average rejected and accepted 
agent cost reports are lower in the Both condition than in the Manager condition (p=0.08 for 
accepted budgets; p=0.05 for rejected budgets). Further, in both conditions the slack capture in 
cost reports that were accepted was significantly lower than the slack capture in cost reports that 
were rejected (p<0.01 in both conditions). Recall from the experimental design section that 
managers were asked to provide an estimate of the agent’s private production cost information 
(similarly, principals were asked to estimate how much profit the manager had to split). 
Perceived slack is measured as [Reported Cost – Perceived Actual Cost]/[$27 – Perceived Actual 
Cost]. The gap between the average slack capture in accepted reports and rejected reports is 
larger in perception in both conditions and the difference remains statistically significant (p<0.01 
in both conditions). 
 Table 4, Panel B shows the manager’s proposed share, as a percentage of the available 
profit, when the principal rejected the managers profit split compared to when they accepted the 
profit split. The percentage of available profit is calculated as the amount of profit the manager 
assigned to themselves divided by the available profit (i.e. $27 minus the cost reported by the 
agent). As seen in the table, there is very little difference between the average manager profit 
when the principal accepted versus when the principal rejected; this difference is not statistically 
significant in either condition (both p>0.30). In fact, in the Principal condition, while the 
difference between the average accepted and rejected manager profit is a statistical zero, the  
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principal, on average, accepted a smaller share of the surplus than they rejected. This general 
result no longer holds when examining the principal’s perception of what they were rejecting 
versus what they were accepting. In Table 4, Panel B, the perceived manager percent of profit is 
measured as the amount of profit the manager assigned to themselves divided by the principal’s 
perception of the amount of available profit. The principal perceived that they were rejecting 
manager proposals that were, on average, statistically higher than the proposals they were 
accepting (p<0.01 in both conditions).  
To better understand this difference in the rejection behaviour of managers and 
principals, I examined how accurately managers and principals estimated production costs and 
available profit, respectively. To measure accuracy, the following metrics are developed:14,15 
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14 Note that the average absolute profit deviation measure contains instances in which the manager rejected the 
budget. In these cases, the profit available for the manager to split between themselves and the principal was zero. 
Recall, however, that the principal only sees that they were offered zero profit and therefore are free to estimate 
what the actual profit was from any amount on [$0, $14]. 
15 An absolute error measure is developed because when the denominator, actual profit, is zero, relative percent error 
of profit would be undefined. Actual profit is zero when either the agent reports the maximum production cost of 
$27 or the manager rejects the budget. There are 283 of these instances in the data set. Somewhat surprisingly, there 
are few, if any, feasible alternative measures of relative percent error, particularly in cases such as this where the 
estimated value can also be zero. 
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# Principal # Both
Rejections Rejected
n/a n/a
0 63
(26%)
133 133
(55%)
111 114
(56%)
Frequency Principal Action Frequency
150 Approve 90
Reject 60
54 Approve 3
Reject 51
Rejections
None n/a
(n=240)
Manager 63
a In the Both  condition, if the manager approved the agent's report, the principal was informed of the manager's 
allocation of the available profit and then asked to either approve or reject the budget. If the manager rejected the 
agent's report, then the principal was informed only that the amount of profit being sent was $0. They were not 
informed that the manager had rejected the budget. Panel B shows that, out of the 54 instances in which the 
manager rejected the agent's report, the principal also rejected 51 times. In the remaining three instances, they 
approved the allocation of $0 that resulted from the manager's rejection of the agent's cost report.
Accept
Reject
TABLE 3: Budget Rejections
Both 54
(n=204)
Panel B: Rejections in the Both Condition a
Manager Action
(n=240)
Principal
Panel A: Frequency of Rejection by Condition
# Manager
0
(n=240)
Condition
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n = 54 n = 54 n = 63 n = 63
n = 150 n = 150 n = 177 n = 177
n = 60 n = 60 n = 60 n = 60
n = 90 n = 90 n = 90 n = 90
TABLE 4: Comparison of Accepted versus Rejected Offers
Panel A: Slack Approved vs. Rejected by Managers a
0.4848
Rejected 
Budgets
Actual % 
Slack
Both  Condition Manager  Condition
Perceived 
% Slack
Actual % 
Slack
Perceived 
% Slack
0.6071
0.3807
Panel B: Manager Profit Approved vs. Rejected by Principals b
Both  Condition Principal  Condition
Accepted 
Budgets
0.6745 0.7810
0.4361 0.3821
0.7833
Actual 
Manager 
% Profit
Perceived 
Manager 
% Profit
Actual 
Manager 
% Profit
Perceived 
Manager 
% Profit
a Actual % Slack is calculated as (Reported Cost - Actual Cost)/($27 - Actual Cost). Perceived % Slack is 
calculated as (Reported Cost - Perceived Actual Cost)/($27 - Perceived Actual Cost). 
0.7822
Accepted 
Budgets
0.6166 0.6284 0.5705 0.5521
b Actual Manager % Profit is calculated as (Available Profit - Principal Profit)/Available Profit, where 
Available Profit is $27 less the agent's reported cost and Principal Profit is the amount offered to the 
principal by the manager. Perceived Manager % Profit is calculated as (Perceived Available Profit - Principal 
Profit)/Perceived Available Profit.
Rejected 
Budgets
0.6504 0.7531 0.5384
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Table 5, Panel A provides descriptive statistics relative to absolute cost deviation and 
absolute profit deviation for each condition. Results indicate that managers and principals have a 
difficult time accurately estimating the production cost and available profit given the information 
asymmetry present in the setting; the managers estimates are incorrect by $3.81 on average and 
principals are incorrect by $4.76 on average. In every condition, managers appear to be better at 
estimating production costs than principals are at estimating available profit. Specifically, 
managers are significantly better at estimating profit in the Manager and None conditions; this is 
not the case in the other two conditions. As shown in Table 5, Panel B, comparisons of 
estimation accuracy between budget rejections and budget approvals show that both roles are 
better at making estimates when they approve than when they reject (these differences are 
statistically significant in all conditions for both roles; all p<0.03). When linking these results to 
the discussion above regarding differences in the amount of manager surplus rejected versus 
approved by principals, the story that emerges is that principals are poor enough at estimating the 
amount of available profit when they reject the managers’ proposals that it impedes their ability 
to make rational decisions regarding budget rejections. This is meant in the strictest sense of the 
term “rationality” – i.e. principals accept smaller shares and reject larger shares in the Principal 
condition.  
 
Firm-Level Outcomes 
As a final analysis, I examine the firm’s outcomes. Regardless of the agent’s actions, the 
bottom-line concern for the firm’s residual claimant (the principal in this setting) is the amount 
of residual they claim. To get a sense of how well the firm does under the various budgetary 
control schemes, I calculate how much surplus each of the three actors claim in each condition.  
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All Both Principal Manager None
Mean $3.81 $3.26 $3.44 $3.67 $4.77
Std. Dev. $3.01 $2.57 $2.72 $2.75 $3.62
Min $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Max $13.80 $13.78 $13.80 $12.33 $13.80
Mean $4.76 $3.37 $3.70 $5.63 $6.11
Std. Dev. $4.25 $3.36 $3.28 $4.51 $4.88
Min $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Max $14.00 $14.00 $14.00 $14.00 $14.00
Both Principal Manager None
Budget Approved: $3.02 n/a $3.39 n/a
Budget Rejected: $3.92 n/a $4.47 n/a
p-value (difference = 0) 0.03 <0.01
Budget Approved: $2.39 $2.50 n/a n/a
Budget Rejected: $4.19 $4.67 n/a n/a
p-value (difference = 0) <0.01 <0.01
<0.01 <0.01
TABLE 5: Accuracy of Estimations
a Absolute cost deviation is measured as the manager's perception of the production cost less the actual 
production cost.
b Absolute profit deviation is measured as the principal's perception of the available profit less the actual 
available profit.
Average Absolute Cost 
Average Absolute Profit 
Panel B: Accuracy of Estimations: Approvals vs. Rejections
Average Absolute Cost 
Average Absolute Cost 
p-value (test of equality of cost 
and profit deviations)
<0.01 0.70
Condition
Condition
Panel A: Average Absolute Cost Deviation a  and Average Absolute 
Profit Deviation b  by Condition
0.36
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In the participative budgeting setting, the surplus is set once the actual cost is known and 
the total amount of surplus available over the course of the twelve rounds of the experiment was 
the same for each firm (specifically, $93.10). The percentage of surplus claimed, therefore, is 
calculated as the total amount of surplus claimed by agents, managers, or principals in each 
condition divided by the total surplus available to the firms in that condition. Figure 4 shows the 
average surplus claimed by the firm’s three actors across the four conditions. The portion of the 
graph labeled “Lost” is due to situations in which the budget was rejected by at least one of the 
superior actors; recall that the result of a rejection is that the entire surplus is foregone. The 
figure shows that the choice of whether and where to locate budget rejection authority has a 
substantial impact on both how much surplus the firm is able to claim and who, within the firm, 
receives the claimed surplus. Generally speaking, granting budget rejection authority to someone 
in the firm improves the principal’s share but comes at the cost of the firm rejecting a sizeable 
portion of their profitable production. Further, granting budget rejection authority to the 
principal, either alone or along with the manager, is particularly damaging to the firm’s overall 
ability to take advantage of surplus-generating production as nearly 45% of the total available 
surplus is lost to rejected budgets.  
Tables 6 and 7 provide additional information on the amount of surplus received by each 
role. Table 6, Panel A shows the average amount of surplus received by each role in each 
condition and Panel B shows t-test comparisons of these amounts. Overall, the table shows three 
results. First, the agent receives less surplus as rejection authority is incorporated. Second, the 
manager does best when they are the only individual with rejection authority. Third, the principal  
receives a larger share of the surplus when rejection authority has been implemented somewhere 
in the firm but does not earn a significantly different share depending on where rejection 
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authority has been implemented. Table 7, Panel A provides average surplus received by each role 
conditional on the budget not being rejected (Panel B provides associated t-test comparisons). 
This panel reveals that, as long as the budget is not rejected, the principal does do best when they 
have rejection authority (in the Both and Principal conditions). However, it is clear when 
interpreting the overall results from Tables 6 and 7 that the condition in which the principal does 
best when “successful” budgeting occurs (i.e. no rejection happens), also comes with the highest 
rejection rates which has economic consequences for the principal.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This study examines the question of where, within the firm’s hierarchy, an important 
budgetary control – the authority to reject the budget – should best be located. The literature in 
economics on optimal firm height makes the point that, as the firm “grows up,” there is often a 
point at which the time constraints and cognitive load placed on the firm’s owner become too 
burdensome (e.g. Williamson 1967, Colombo and Grilli 2013). A typical response to this 
problem is to grow the firm vertically by incorporating one or more levels of managers. When 
this happens, an important decision that needs to be made is exactly which duties should be 
delegated to these managers and which should be retained by the principal.  
The results of this study yield three broad takeaways. First, in spite of theory-driven 
concerns that delegating budget rejection authority to the manager may result in more 
misreporting by agents, this study provides evidence suggesting that this is not a primary 
concern. Specifically, when only the manager has rejection authority, agent misreporting is 
statistically indistinguishable from an arrangement in which the only the principal has such 
authority. Second, the question of where to locate budget rejection authority in hierarchical firms  
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FIGURE 4
Distribution of Surplus
The percentage of surplus received by each role in each Condition is determined by taking the total amount 
of surplus received by a given role in a given Condition and dividing by the total amount of surplus 
available in the Condition. For example, there were 20 firms in the Manager condition and each firm could 
claim a maximum of $93.10 over the course of the twelve rounds. As a result, there was a total of $1862 of 
surplus available, of which the agents received $726.30. Thus, they received $726.30/$1862 = 39% of the 
total surplus. 
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Both Principal Manager None
Agents
Mean 17.85% 23.02% 35.76% 77.56%
Std. Dev. 23.90% 30.02% 32.06% 33.45%
Managers
Mean 16.13% 12.14% 28.13% 16.02%
Std. Dev. 20.38% 16.67% 27.80% 24.74%
Principals
Mean 10.13% 9.42% 9.86% 6.42%
Std. Dev. 14.01% 13.74% 11.15% 14.89%
Manager Principal Both Manager Principal Both
None <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 None <0.01 0.04 0.96
Manager <0.01 <0.01 Manager <0.01 <0.01
Principal 0.05 Principal 0.02
Manager Principal Both
None <0.01 0.02 0.01
Manager 0.70 0.82
Principal 0.59
Table 6: Surplus Received by Role
Panel A: Average Surplus Received by Role and Condition
Condition
a: All entries in the tables in Panel B are p-values of t-test comparisons of the average amount of surplus received 
in the conditions along the vertical and horizontal axes. For example, the p-value of the t-test comparing the 
average surplus received by principals in the Manager  and the average surplus received by principals in the Both 
conditions is 0.82.
Principals
Panel B: T-test Comparisons of Received Surplus a
Agents Managers
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Both Principal Manager None
Agents
Mean 40.47% 51.63% 48.48% 77.56%
Std. Dev. 19.42% 23.25% 27.85% 33.45%
Managers
Mean 36.56% 27.23% 38.15% 16.02%
Std. Dev. 13.84% 14.54% 25.80% 24.74%
Principals
Mean 22.97% 21.14% 13.37% 6.42%
Std. Dev. 12.24% 13.26% 11.03% 14.89%
Manager Principal Both Manager Principal Both
None <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 None <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Manager 0.33 0.02 Manager <0.01 0.59
Principal <0.01 Principal <0.01
Manager Principal Both
None <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Manager <0.01 <0.01
Principal 0.32
Table 7: Surplus Received by Role Conditional on No Budget Rejections
Panel A: Average Surplus Received by Role and Condition
a: All entries in the tables in Panel B are p-values of t-test comparisons of the average amount of surplus 
received in the conditions along the vertical and horizontal axes. For example, the p-value of the t-test 
comparing the average surplus received by principals in the Manager  and the average surplus received by 
principals in the Both conditions is less than 0.01.
Agents Managers
Principals
Panel B: T-test Comparisons of Received Surplus a 
Condition
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is nuanced and the best choice critically depends on the exact goal(s) of the firm implementing 
the controls. If the goal is to reduce slack capture by the agent, to ensure a more equal 
distribution of surplus to the various levels of the firm and/or to ensure that the residual claimant 
receives as much surplus as possible, then the results of this study suggest that rejection authority 
should be included at every hierarchical layer beyond the first. Third, the incorporation of 
rejection authority leads to a sizeable “deadweight loss” due to the rejection of budgets and 
entails noticeable economic consequences for the residual claimant. Further, this result has the 
flavour of the tradeoff described in Antle and Eppen (1985) in which the principal pre-commits 
to funding, at a given hurdle rate, any budget report less than or equal to the hurdle rate (i.e. the 
principal provides funds equal to the hurdle rate) and rejecting any report above that. The 
fundamental concern stemming from that model is that, in order to curb agent opportunism, the 
firm must forego profitable opportunities. Despite that fact no hurdle rate is implemented in this 
study, the same type of tradeoff is observed as a result of budget rejection authority. 
Additionally, because the both superior actors (particularly the principal) have a difficult time 
evaluating the reports of their subordinates, the rejection behaviour of the superior actors may 
not make them better off in some instances. This implies that even simple decision aids or 
information systems may act to ameliorate the effects of rejections and control agent slack but 
cause the firm to give up less in profitable production.  
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